MCP Server Auth Template
OAuth 2.1/OIDC resource-server reference for secure MCP authorization
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If you have run it, two minutes of your experience saves the next person an afternoon.
MCP Server Auth Template tools
No tool declarations could be read from the package source. They show once the server is installed.
Public scan report
scanner v0.1.9 · 2026-09-23 · same rubric, same numbers if you re-run it
- –Code scanpackage could not be scannedn/a
- –Live reliabilityno gateway calls yet and no remote to proben/a
- –Tool poisoningtools not inspected (local package is not executed); not countedn/a
- Auth qualitylocal package, no credentials required12/15
- Maintenancelast push 0 days ago15/15
- Maintainer identityregistry namespace matches repository owner; GitHub account older than a year8/10
What the publisher says
From the MCP Server Auth Template repository's README, as published. We do not edit it. Read it on GitHub
mcp-server-auth-template
Leia em português
A production-oriented OAuth 2.1 resource-server reference for remote MCP: Microsoft Entra ID and
generic OIDC, exact token/resource validation, fail-closed authorization, progressive scope
challenges, stateless MCP 2026-07-28, and metadata-only OpenTelemetry evidence.
Use this repository when the hard part is not "how do I expose an MCP tool?" but how do I expose it without weakening identity, authorization, transport, and observability boundaries. The server pairs with mcp-client-auth-template for an executable end-to-end reference using synthetic identities and no production credentials.
What this repository proves
The paired executable path validates real resource-server behavior rather than configuration claims:
not depend on MCP SDK defaults
- ✅ RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata is published by the resource server
- ✅ RFC 8707 resource binding becomes an exact JWT audience boundary
- ✅ issuer, signature, expiry, algorithm/key compatibility and caller type fail closed
- ✅ delegated scopes and Entra application roles remain distinct authorization concepts
- ✅ 403 insufficient_scope is returned before dispatch for progressive authorization
- ✅ wrong-audience tokens are rejected with 401, with an explicit token-resource policy that does
- ✅ tools/list is filtered per principal and carries only bounded private cache hints
- ✅ protected tools stay hidden from anonymous catalog discovery
- ✅ MCP 2026-07-28 stays stateless and does not mint Mcp-Session-Id
- ✅ generic OIDC and Microsoft Entra ID share one application boundary without provider leakage
- ✅ W3C trace context reaches the server while OAuth/MCP sensitive values stay out of telemetry
- ✅ release artifacts, container evidence, SBOMs and provenance are validated by executable gates
For a requirement-by-requirement view of the paired OAuth/MCP behavior, including explicit evidence gaps and discussion topics for the MCP Authorization Interest Group / Tool Scopes Working Group, see the Authorization Implementer Report.
Architecture
flowchart LR
Client["MCP client"] -->|"OAuth 2.1 / OIDC"| AS["Authorization server<br/>Entra ID or generic OIDC"]
Client -->|"MCP 2026-07-28<br/>resource-bound bearer"| Admission["Transport admission"]
Admission --> AuthN["Token verification"]
AuthN --> AuthZ["Tool authorization"]
AuthZ --> Tools["MCP tools"]
Server["This resource server"] --- Admission
Server -->|"OIDC discovery + cached JWKS"| AS
Server -.->|"W3C trace context + OTLP"| Collector["OpenTelemetry Collector"]
Collector --> Tempo["Tempo"]
Tempo --> Grafana["Grafana"]The authorization server owns login, consent, client registration and token issuance. This repository owns the protected resource: transport admission, metadata publication, access-token verification, request-scoped principal construction, tool authorization and dispatch.
For layer boundaries and the detailed authorization sequence, see Architecture.
5-minute verification
Shortened. The full README is on GitHub.
Nothing above is checked by us. What we check is on the safety report.
Install directly
claude mcp add mcp-server-auth-template -- docker run -i --rm ghcr.io/brunovicco/mcp-server-auth-template:v0.7.0
MCP Server Auth Template: common questions
- Is MCP Server Auth Template safe?
- Yes, by our scan: it is graded A (88/100). Read the MCP Server Auth Template safety report
- How do I install MCP Server Auth Template?
- It runs on your machine. Copy the Claude Code, Claude Desktop or Cursor config from the install section.
- Does MCP Server Auth Template need an API key?
- No secret keys are declared. It reads 10 settings from the environment.
- Is MCP Server Auth Template maintained?
- The last commit was in the last day (2026-09-23). The latest release is v0.7.0.
- What can I use instead of MCP Server Auth Template?
- Servers from other publishers that do the same job: spintax.net MCP server, Paxaver MCP server and Notebooklm Secure MCP server. Compare all MCP Server Auth Template alternatives.
Alternatives to MCP Server Auth Template
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